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Abstract
I study the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individ-
uals draw random samples of strategies used in the past and respond to it by using a
behavioural rule Even though individuals actually respond to historical demands, a nec-
essary condition for stability is the existence of a state such that it is as-if the individuals
are hardwired to make the same demand. Furthermore, the state where all individuals
demand half of the pie is the unique neutrally stable state; all other states are unstable
in the face of an invasion by a mutant behavioural rule.
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1 Introduction
Consider a situation where two parties can potentially generate a surplus of fixed size by
means of a transaction, or alternatively, by some form of cooperation. This transaction or
cooperation will be undertaken only if the two parties can first agree on how the surplus will
be divided. In order to reach an agreement, they bargain with each other by simultaneously
claiming a share of the surplus (or pie) for himself. They receive their respective claims if the
two demands are compatible, i.e. they sum up to no greater than unity. Otherwise, there is
an impasse – the transaction (or cooperation) is not undertaken, the surplus is not generated,
and neither party receives anything. While this represents a very basic and arguably pervasive
situation, its resolution is not obvious. In this paper, I posit that individuals try to resolve
this situation of strategic uncertainty by paying attention and responding to the antecedents
(i.e. the recent history of demands) in a manner that is determined by a behavioural rule.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the evolutionary stability of a population comprised
of such behavioural rules, and explore the implication of stability for the manner in which
the pie is divided in this bargaining game.
I consider a population of individuals (which may be finite or be described by individuals
distributed over a continuum of fixed mass), where each individual interacts with all other
individuals in a pair-wise fashion to play the bargaining game. The primary component of the
decision-process which governs the demand that an individual will make is his behavioural
rule: individuals draw a random sample of demands that have been made in the previous
time period, and respond to the distribution of demands in the sample in a manner dictated
by his behavioural rule. I impose a weak restriction, namely ‘mild responsiveness’, on each
behavioural rule. (I argue in Section 2 that this is the weakest condition that should be
satisfied by any reasonable behavioural rule that responds to the information about demands
made in the past.) The demands that the individuals make determines the outcome of the
bargaining game. The fitness of a behavioural rule is a function of the average share of the pie
received by individuals that follow that particular behavioural. I differentiate between two
cases: one, where the population is homogeneous, i.e. all individuals are described by the same
(mildly responsive) behavioural rule, and the other when the population is heterogeneous, i.e.
not all individuals are described by the same (mildly responsive) behavioural rule. Then, a
population comprised of the incumbent behavioural rules is said to be stable if there exists
a state (or configuration of demands made by individuals in the population) such that the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) internal stability: the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules must be the same; if not,
then it is possible that a fitter incumbent behavioural rule displaces an incumbent behavioural
rule that is less fit, leading to the incumbent population composition not being stable, and,
(ii) external stability: suppose that an individual from a particular behavioural rule mutates
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to, or experiments with, another (mildly responsive) behavioural rule (in case of population
defined by a continuum of individuals, I suppose that a fraction of individuals from a particular
behavioural rule mutate to, or experiment with, another (mildly responsive) behavioural rule);
external stability requires the incumbent behavioural rule(s) to be fitter than any such mutant
behavioural rule. Here, I appeal to an un-modelled dynamic process that selects in favour of
fitter behavioural rules, and against less fit behavioural rules – then, external stability is a
necessary condition for reversion to the initial population composition.
While both these conditions need to be satisfied for stability of a heterogeneous population,
it is self-evident that only the external stability condition is relevant for a homogeneous
population. I also define the weaker notion of neutral stability, which requires, in addition
to internal stability (in case of heterogeneous population), that whenever an individual (in
case of a finite population) or a fraction of individuals (in case of an infinite population) from
a particular behavioural rule mutates to, or experiments with, another (mildly responsive)
behavioural rule, then the incumbent behavioural rules should not be less fit than the mutant
behavioural rule. In particular, a population is neutrally stable if there exists a state where
the incumbent and mutant behavioural rules are equally fit: the interpretation is that here,
all the behavioural rules co-exist without displacing one another.
Interestingly, I show that internal stability has a striking implication: a necessary con-
dition for a state to be stable is that an individual must always choose the same demand,
and this holds for all individuals. Thus, even though each individual actually responds to the
demands made by in the past, a necessary condition for stability is that the configuration of
demands is such that it is as-if individuals are hard-wired to play the same strategy. I call
this the hardwired behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem. While this result is
not relevant for a homogeneous population, it significantly simplifies the analysis of external
stability for a heterogeneous population.
The application of the external stability criterion gives the result that there does not ex-
ist any state for any combination of incumbent behavioural rule(s) that is stable against all
mutant behavioural rules. This implies that a population made up of any particular mildly re-
sponsive behavioural rule, or any combination of mildly responsive behavioural rules, is unsta-
ble. However, any homogeneous or heterogeneous incumbent population of behavioural rules
may be ‘neutrally stable’, i.e. the incumbent behavioural rule(s) may be as fit as the mutant,
but this happens if and only if each individual in the incumbent population asks for exactly
half of the pie. Thus, the state where all individuals split the surplus equally is the unique
neutrally stable state for any particular mildly responsive behavioural rule/combination of
mildly responsive behavioural rules, and all other states are neutrally unstable.
The primary contribution of the paper, as alluded to above, is to propose a notion and
develop a framework for analysing the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules (rather than
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evolutionary stability of strategies), which is then applied to the bargaining game. The con-
ventional notion of evolutionary stability, introduced in Smith and Price (1973), assumes that
each individual is hard-wired to play a fixed strategy, and the analysis is thus restricted to
stability of a particular strategy (in case of a ‘monomorphic’ population), or to a particular in-
variant mix of strategies (in case of a ‘polymorphic’ population). However, a more reasonable
assumption in socio-economic contexts is that individuals, instead of being hard-wired to play
the same strategy over time, do in fact respond to information by using a behavioural rule.
Then, the object of interest is the stability of a population comprised of either of a particular
behavioural rule or a mix of different behavioural rules, and the consequent implication of
stability for how the surplus is shared.
Related Literature
A variety of approaches have been proposed to resolve the bargaining problem. Nash (1950)
and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) put forth axiomatic solutions, while Rubinstein (1982)
examines the equilibrium of the alternating offer bargaining game. In contrast, this paper
follows an evolutionary approach, and analyses the stability of a population comprising of
various behavioural rules, and examines the implication of stability of the population for the
division of the pie. Other papers which also adopt an evolutionary approach to the bargaining
problem can be broadly classified into two categories.
(a) Firstly, papers such as Skyrms (1994) and Ellingsen (1997) examine evolutionary stability
of strategies in the bargaining game. Skyrms (1994) argues that the state where all individu-
als demand exactly half of the pie is the only stable ‘monomorphic’ population configuration
(i.e. the only evolutionary stable state when all individuals in the population choose an iden-
tical time-invariant demand). There may exist stable polymorphic configurations (where
different individuals choose different but time-invariant strategies), but with random shocks,
the population would tend to gravitate towards the stable equal split monomorphic state.
Ellingsen (1997) studies a framework where there are some obstinate individuals who are
hard-wired to make the same demand, and some responsive agents who are able to identify
their opponent and choose their strategy accordingly. Importantly, Ellingsen assumes that
responsive agents are not actually responsive against each other but only against the obsti-
nate agents. Using the term ‘fair’ for obstinate agents who demand exactly half of the pie,
Ellingsen shows that any stable population will comprise only of fair agents and responsive
agents, with the fair agents forming the majority of the population. Further, with some per-
turbation in the size of the pie, a stable population profile consists only of fair agents.
(b) Secondly, Young (1993) studies an adaptive play model of the bargaining game where
individuals respond to the recent history of play by best-responding to the distribution of de-
mands that is obtained by drawing a random sample from the history of play. Young (1993)
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goes on to demonstrate that the stochastically stable division of the pie corresponds to an
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. This framework is extended by Binmore, Samuel-
son and Young (2003) to consider different best-response protocols, and by Saez-Marti and
Weibull (1998) and Khan and Peeters (2014) to the case where individuals may exhibit ‘higher-
order’ best responses.
This paper differs from both these strands in the literature. As has been discussed ear-
lier, the primary difference with Skyrms (1994) or Ellingsen (1997) is that here, individuals
respond to the manner in which the bargaining game has unfolded in the past, and this leads
me to develop and analyse the stability of behavioural rules rather than stability of strate-
gies. This impetus on evolutionary stability of behavioural rules, where I look at a large
class of such rules rather than very specific rules, differentiates this paper from Young (1993)
and the other related papers referred to above – while the decision-makers in these papers
respond to the way in which the game has unfolded, the only behavioural rule considered is
best-responding, or some variant of it; further, their objective is not to analyse the stabil-
ity of the behavioural rule but to determine the stochastically stable state of the game for
a specific choice of a behavioural rule. In this context, the behavioural rule approach used
in this paper also generalises the sampling best response studied in Oyama, Sandholm and
Tercieux (2015). Existing papers that examine the interaction between individuals who use
different behavioural rules include Kaniovski, Kryazhimskii and Young (2000), Juang (2002),
Josephson (2009) and Khan (2018). However, as in Young (1993), the aim of these papers is
not the stability of the behavioural rules but on the stochastically stable set when individuals
behave according to disparate behavioural rules.
Plan of the paper
In section 2, I develop the notion of stability of behavioural rules for the finite population
version of the bargaining game, and present the result of the analysis of this framework. In
Section 3, motivated by the observation in Schaffer (1988) that evolutionary stable strategies
for a finite population may differ from the evolutionary stable strategies when the population
is described by individuals distributed over a continuum of fixed mass, I extend the finite pop-
ulation framework to the case of a continuum of individuals, and show that results obtained
for a finite population carry over to this case as well. Section 4 concludes.
2 The bargaining game: a finite population
Consider a finite population comprised of n individuals. Each individual interacts in pairs with
all the n− 1 other individuals, and bargains over a pie/surplus of unit size by simultaneously
announcing the share of the pie that they claim for themselves. The individuals in a pair
receive their respective claims if the two claims are compatible, i.e. their sum does not exceed
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unity; otherwise they receive nothing. In a given time period t, each individual makes the
same demand in his interaction with all other individuals, and cannot update his demand
between interactions in that period. Let xi,t ∈ (0, 1) be the demand made by individual i
in period t; I assume that individuals do not demand the entire pie, and neither do they
demand nothing at all. xt = (x1,t, . . . , xn,t) is the vector of demands made the n individuals in
period t. I denote individual i’s period t payoff from his interaction with another individual j,
who chooses xj,t ∈ (0, 1), by pi(xi,t, xj,t). pi(xi,t, xj,t) equals xi,t if xi,t + xj,t ≤ 1, and 0
otherwise. The total payoff of individual i in period t is pii,t(xt) =
1
n−1 Σj∈N\{i}pi(xi,t, xj,t),
i.e. the average share of the pie he receives in his bargaining interactions in that period.
pit(xt) = (pi1,t(xt), . . . , pin,t(xt)) is the vector of payoffs received by the n individuals in period t.
I now describe the manner in which an individual i chooses his demand. This decision
process has two components, each of which is described below: a response set that is derived
from a behavioural rule, and an inward-looking set; each element in these two sets has strictly
positive probability of being chosen.
(a) With positive probability pi ∈ (0, 1) (which may vary by individual), at the end of period t,
individual i draws a random sample (without replacement) of strategies of exogenously fixed
size S (with S ≤ n) from xt (i.e. the strategies used in period t). A feasible sample is defined
as any sample of size S that can be drawn without replacement from the demands made in
the previous period. Depending on the value of S, he may obtain the entire distribution of
strategies (when S = n), or a strict subset of the strategies used (when S < n). In case of
the latter, any feasible sample has a strictly positive probability of being drawn; however,
it is possible that particular samples comprised of demands made by specific individuals
have a higher probability of being drawn. Let si,t denote the sample drawn by individual i.
supp(si,t) = {x : x ∈ si,t} is the support of sample si,t, and represents the strategies that
appear in the randomly drawn sample si,t. Individual i associated with a time-invariant
behavioural rule Ri : (0, 1)
S ⇒ (0, 1) that goes from the space of feasible samples to a set of
demands in the interval (0, 1). Ri(si,t) is the response set of individual i corresponding to
the sample si,t, and each element of the response set has strictly positive probability of being
played by him.
I define individual i to be mildly responsive, or alternatively his behavioural rule Ri to be
mildly responsive, if supp(si,t) = {x} implies Ri(si,t) ⊂ {x, 1 − x}, for any time period t
and any x ∈ (0, 1). A few salient comments on mildly responsive behavioural rules are as
follows. Firstly, mild responsiveness does impose any restriction whatsoever on the response
set when the support of the sample is non-singleton. Secondly, mild responsiveness allows for
a variety of possibilities for the behavioural rule, even when the support of the drawn sample
is a singleton; for example if supp(si,t) = {x}, then:
(i) the behavioural rule might imply that the individual assumes that the his co-players’
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demands will be drawn from the same distribution as the sample; since supp(si,t) = {x}, he
expects his co-players to demand x, and so he demands Ri(si,t) = {1− x} for all x ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) the behavioural rule might result in the individual expecting that his co-players will
respond by demanding 1−x; so anticipating this, he demands Ri(si,t) = {x} for all x ∈ (0, 1),
(iii) the behavioural rule might cause the individual to have higher order beliefs about how
the co-players might respond, and depending on the degree of higher order belief, he demands
x or 1− x; hence, either Ri(si,t) = {x} or Ri(si,t) = {1− x} for all x ∈ (0, 1)
(iv) it might be that Ri(si,t) = {x, 1 − x} for all x ∈ (0, 1), implying that due to reasons
outlined above, the individual probabilistically demands x or 1− x
(v) there exists some values of x ∈ (0, 1) for which Ri(si,t) = {x}, other values of x for
which Ri(si,t) = {1 − x} and yet other values of x for which Ri(si,t) = {x, 1 − x}, or some
combination thereof.
I argue that mild responsiveness is the weakest condition that must be satisfied by any
behavioural rule that responds to past information – after all, conditional on individual’s
response depending on the obtained sample, the situation where a sample comprises of only
one particular strategy is the simplest decision making situation for an individual; if the
supp(si(t)) = {x} does not imply Ri(si,t) ⊂ {x, 1 − x}, then the individual is not respon-
sive to the obtained information at all. Hence, it is the weakest condition that should be
satisfied by any behavioural rule that responds to information obtained from the sample.
Pertinently, while the mild responsiveness is motivated by how a behavioural rule would in-
duce an individual to respond to a sample whose support is a singleton, it is also consistent
with imitative behavioural or imitation of demands chosen by others in the past (in case of
imitation, Ri(si,t) = {x} for all x ∈ (0, 1)).
Now that the behavioural rules have been defined, let the population of n individuals
comprises of K disparate mildly responsive behavioural rules: two behavioural rules RI and
RJ are disparate if there exists at least one random sample of demands s ∈ (0, 1)S such that
RI(s) 6= RJ(s), where I, J ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and I 6= J . I use lower case letters such as i to denote
an individual in the population, and upper case letters such as I to denote a behavioural rule
without reference to the individual. So, if Ri(s) = RI(s) for all samples s, then the behavioural
rule of the ith individual is RI ; I use the notation i ∈ I to denote that individual i belongs to
behavioural rule RI , and PBR(i) to denote the parent behavioural rule of individual i (i.e. the
behavioural rule to which individual i belongs). Let nI(t) be the number of individuals who
belong to the behavioural rule RI in period t, with I ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Then (n1(t), . . . , nK(t)),
with ΣKI=1nI = n, is the composition vector – it describes the composition of the population
in time period t in terms of the number of individuals corresponding to each behavioural
rule. piI,t(xt) is the nI dimensional vector of payoffs of individuals belonging to behavioural
rule RI , and min piI,t(xt) and max piI,t(xt) are the minimal and maximal element of piI,t(xt).
When K = 1, the population is homogeneous in that it comprises of only one behavioural
rule; in this case I will denote the behavioural rule simply by R.
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(b) At the end of period t, each individual knows about the demands made and payoffs
received by the individuals who follow the same behavioural rule as him. Each individual i
has an inward-looking correspondence Ii : (0, 1)
N × [0, 1]N ⇒ (0, 1) that maps from the space
of demands made and payoffs received by individuals of the same behavioural rule to an
inward-looking set Ii(xt, pit(xt)) ⊂ {xj,t : j ∈ PBR(i)}, which is a subset of the strategies
used by the individuals who belong to the same parent behavioural rule. With strictly positive
probability 1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), individual i’s demand comes from the set Ii(xt, pit(xt)). This
inward-looking correspondence is very general in nature, and allows for a wide variety of
protocols. Prominent example includes (i) inertia: an individual does not change his strategy
and makes the same demand he had made, (ii) imitation of the strategy that resulted in the
highest payoff in some subset of the individuals who follow the same behavioural rule as him,
(iii) imitation of the most commonly used strategy in some subset of the individuals who
follow the same behavioural rule as him.
Summarily, the state at the end of period t is described by xt = (x1,t, . . . , xn,t) i.e. the
demands made by the n individuals. At the end of this period, with probability p(i) ∈ (0, 1),
individual i draws a sample si,t of size S from xt, and his demand comes from his response set
Ri(si,t), which is derived from the operation of the individual’s behavioural on the sample, and
each element of Ri(si,t) having strictly positive probability of being chosen; with probability
1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), the individual’s demand comes from his inward-looking set Ii(xt, pit(xt)).
Dropping the time sub-script, a state x′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) is denoted to be a successor state
of x = (x1, . . . , xn) if x
′
i ∈ Ri(si) ∪ Ii(x, pi(x)) for some feasible sample si ⊂ x, and this
holds for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let Suc(x) = {x′ ∈ (0, 1)N : x′i ∈ Ri(si) ∪ Ii(x, pi(x)), for all
i = 1, . . . , n} denote the set of successor states of x, and let Sucz(x) be defined recursively as
Sucz(x) = {y ∈ (0, 1)N : y ∈ Suc(q) for all q ∈ Sucz−1(x)} for all natural numbers z > 2. A
state x is said to be absorbing if Suc∞(x) = {x}: this happens if and only if xi is the only
element in individual i’s inward-looking set as well as his response set for any feasible sample
that may be drawn from x, and this holds for all i = 1, . . . , n; hence, in an absorbing state,
an individual always makes the same demand, and this holds for all individuals. Thus, if a
state is absorbing, it is not possible to transition from it to any other distinct state.
A state is defined to be a convention if a fixed demand x¯ has been chosen by all n
individuals. Here, I make the observation that once a convention, where all individuals
demand x¯, is reached, then the inward-looking set for any inward-looking correspondence
comprises only of x¯; it follows that if an individual chooses a demand x˜ 6= x¯ from the
said convention, then it must be because x˜ belongs to the response set of the individual.
Because I assume that the responsive behavioural rules to be mildly responsive, the equal-
split convention (i.e. when x¯ = 12) is always an absorbing state; in this state, both the inward-
looking set (see argument above) and the response set of any mildly responsive individuals
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are singletons with x¯ = 12 being their only element. If, on the contrary, the convention is
characterized by x¯ 6= 12 , then the convention is absorbing if and only if the behavioural rule
of all the individuals dictates that the any individual’s response to a sample that is formed
only of x¯ is only x¯ itself; if 1− x¯ is an element of the response set of at least one individual,
then such a convention is not absorbing.
The stability of a population comprising of K behavioural rules depends on the fitness
of the incumbent behavioural rules in face of an invasion by a mutant behavioural rule. The
fitness of a behavioural rule at the state xt, FI(piI,t(xt)) : [0, 1]
N ⇒ [0, 1], is a function of the
vector of payoffs obtained by individuals of the behavioural rule RI in that period. The fitness
function may vary by behavioural rule, and the only restriction I impose is FI(piI,t(xt)) ∈ [min
piI,t(xt), max piI,t(xt)] (where min piI,t(xt) and max piI,t(xt) are the minimal and maximal
elements of the vector piI,t(xt) of payoffs received by individuals following behavioural rule RI).
Thus, the fitness of a behavioural rule must lie in between the maximum and minimum payoff
in the sub-population of individuals following the behavioural rule. When the population is
homogeneous (i.e. K = 1), I use the terms fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule and fitness
of the incumbent population interchangeably, and denote the fitness of the homogeneous
population by F (pit(xt)) ∈ [min pit(xt), max pit(xt)].
Now, suppose that one individual m becomes a mildly responsive mutant, with the mu-
tant’s mildly responsive behavioural rule being denoted by Rm. The particular behavioural
rule from which the mutant emerges is termed the source behavioural rule, and the mutation
may be interpreted as an individual experimenting with another behaviour rule. Suppress-
ing the time-index, the payoff of the mutant when it chooses xm ∈ (0, 1) and the state is x
(suppressing the time subscript) is pim(x) =
1
n−1 Σi∈N\{m}pi(xm, xi), i.e the average share of
the pie the mutant receives in its n − 1 bargaining interactions. I equate the fitness of the
mutant behavioural rule, FM (x), with pim(x). I assume that nI ≥ 2,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} – since
I posit that mutation involves an individual from an existing behavioural rule mutating to
another behavioural rule, this assumption ensures that each of the incumbent behavioural
rules is still represented in the population after the mutation; as a result, the fitness of the
mutant behavioural rule can be compared to the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules.
Since the population, in general, comprises of multiple behavioural rules, I impose two con-
ditions, namely internal stability and external stability, for the population to be stable. The
stability notions to be presented are motivated by an un-modelled selection dynamic whereby
a fitter behavioural rules grow in representation at the expense of less fit behavioural rules.
The notion of stability used here is an adaptation of the standard notion of evolutionary
stable strategies (introduced in Smith and Price (1973)), which requires that for a strategy to
be stable, a mutant (which plays another strategy) must always receive lower payoff/fitness
than the incumbents. I adapt the standard stability definition to account for two features.
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Firstly, the population here is finite whereas the more conventional framework assumes a pop-
ulation defined over continuum (of unit mass, for example), which is then invaded by a small
proportion of mutants.1 Secondly, and more importantly, in the more conventional model of
evolutionary stability, it is assumed that each individual in the population is hard-wired to
play a particular action/strategy. While this may be more relevant in a biological context, it
is probably less so in situations where individuals do in fact deliberate over their action and
follow a rule or a heuristic to choose an action. In this paper, it is the behavioural rule (or
the corresponding response correspondence) that is the primitive, and individuals may change
their strategy over time even as they follow their behavioural rule. This has two implications:
(i) In the standard model of evolutionary stability, since each individual’s strategy remains
invariant, the distribution of strategies used in the incumbent population is invariant as well.
However, here, this may not hold as individuals may change their strategies in response to
the history of play. Hence, in the definition of stability, I will require that a mutant should
not be fitter than an incumbent not only in the particular state in question, say x, but also
in any other state that the state may transition into with positive probability (i.e. all states
in Suc∞(x)); only then can one say with certainty that starting from that particular state x,
the mutant behavioural rule will never successfully invade an incumbent population.
(ii) In the standard model of evolutionary stability, all individuals in the incumbent popula-
tion receive the same payoff (as all individuals play an identical strategy), due to which the
fitness of the incumbent population can be equated with the identical payoff received by an in-
dividual in the incumbent population. Here, two individuals belonging to the same incumbent
population may have different payoffs because they may use different strategies – this may
happen either because they draw different samples or because the response correspondence is
not single-valued. This necessitates the use of a fitness function.
A state x is said to be internally stable if FI(piI(y)) = FJ(piJ(y)) for all behavioural rules
I, J = 1, . . . ,K and for all y ∈ x∪ Suc∞(x), i.e. all behavioural rules are equally fit, not only
in the state x in question but also in all states that the particular state may transition to with
positive probability. Recall that since individuals may respond to historical demands, the state
may change over time. Thus, internal stability is a pre-mutant-entry condition, and the equal
fitness of all behavioural rules, not only in the particular state in question but in all the states
that may succeed the particular state, is meant to suggest that the composition vector of the
incumbent population (i.e. the number of individuals following each behavioural rule) remains
stable/unchanged over time. Since a homogeneous population has only one behavioural rule,
the internal stability condition is relevant only for a heterogeneous population.
The external stability condition, on the other hand, compares the fitness of incumbent
behavioural rules and the mutant behavioural rule. A particular state x is externally stable for
1Schaffer (1988) also adapts the notion of evolutionary stable strategies to account for a finite population.
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a particular mix of K incumbent behavioural rules if Fm(y) < FI(piI,t(y)) for all I = 1, . . . ,K
and for all states y ∈ x ∪ Suc∞(x), i.e. the fitness of each incumbent behavioural rule is
strictly higher than the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule not only in that state but all
states that the bargaining game may transition to with positive probability. I consider this
to be a necessary condition for a reversion to the initial population composition by virtue of
the un-modeled selection process selecting against the mutant behavioural rule.
I will also say a state is neutrally externally stable (i) if Fm(y) ≤ FI(piI,t(y)) for all
I = 1, . . . ,K and for all states y ∈ x ∪ Suc∞(x), and (ii) if Fm(y) = FJ(piJ,t(y)) for some
J ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, then FI(piJ,t(y)) = FJ(piJ,t(y)) for I, J ∈ {1, . . . ,K} That is, (i) the fitness
of each incumbent behavioural rule is not lower than the fitness of the mutant behavioural
rule, and (ii) in case the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule is equal to the fitness of at
least one incumbent behavioural rule, then the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules is
the same. In absence of the latter condition, one incumbent behavioural rule might displace
another incumbent behavioural rule via the selection dynamic if the lowest fitness is obtained
by both the mutant behavioural rule and by an incumbent behavioural rule, and there exists
another incumbent behavioural rule that obtains a higher fitness than these two rules – this
is the motivation for condition (ii) above.
A state is said to be stable (neutrally stable) for the population under consideration if the
internal stability and external stability (neutral external stability) conditions are satisfied for
all mildly responsive mutant behavioural rules. As mentioned earlier, a state being stable
is a necessary requirement for the population to revert to its initial composition after the
mutant behavioural rule appears, while the interpretation of a neutrally stable state is that
in such a state, a the mutant behavioural rule cannot further displace incumbent behavioural
rule(s). On the other hand, if the internal stability and external stability (neutral external
stability) conditions are not satisfied for at least one mildly responsive mutant behavioural
rule, then the state is an unstable state (neutrally unstable state). It follows that if a state is
stable (neutrally unstable), it is also neutrally stable (unstable). I will say that a population
of incumbent behavioural rules is stable (neutrally stable) if there exists a state that is stable
(neutrally stable); otherwise the population is said to be unstable (neutrally unstable). In the
particular case of a homogeneous population, a state is stable for a particular behavioural rule
if the internal stability condition and external stability condition hold for all sizes of the finite
population (i.e. for all n); if all states are unstable (neutrally unstable), then the incumbent
behavioural rule is said to be an unstable (neutrally unstable) behavioural rule, and I will also
say that the incumbent and mutant behavioural rules co-exist when pim = F ((pii)i∈N\{m}),
where F ((pii)i∈N\{m}) is the fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule after the entry of the
mutant in the homogeneous population.
I denote the set of states where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand
11
by Ω¯, and make the observation that (i) stability (neutral stability) of at least one state in
Ω¯ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state (neutrally stable
state), and (ii) instability (neutral instability) of all states in Ω¯ is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the non-existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state). The reason is as
follows. Consider a state that does not belong to Ω¯; with positive probability, all individuals
of a particular behavioural rule choose the same sample, in response to which all of them
make the same demand, and so, the bargaining process reaches a state xt ∈ Ω¯. In case of a
homogeneous population, this implies that, with positive probability, the bargaining process
transitions into a convention from any other state. Now, by the definition of stability (neutral
stability), if xt is not stable (neutrally stable), then the initial state cannot be stable (neutrally
stable) either; this follows from the fact that initial state leads to xt with positive probability,
and so, for the former to be stable (neutrally stable), xt has to be stable (neutrally stable) as
well. Hence instability (neutrally instability) of all states in Ω¯ is sufficient to conclude that
all states are unstable (neutrally unstable); it is also trivially true that the instability of all
states in Ω¯ is necessary for all states to be unstable. So, stability of at least one state in Ω¯
is necessary for a stable state (neutrally stable) to exist; but at the same time, if a state in
Ω¯ is stable (neutrally stable), then a stable state (neutrally stable) exists. Thus, stability
(neutrally stability) of at least one state in Ω¯ is necessary and sufficient for a stable state
(neutrally stable) to exist. Consequently, for the analysis of stability, it suffices to examine
states in the set Ω¯.
There are two other implications of states in the set Ω¯. Firstly, for any such state, the
inward-looking set is a singleton and comprises only of the demand chosen by the individual
himself. Hence, even though the inward-looking correspondence is very general, in states in
the set Ω¯, it is as-if the inward-looking correspondence is equivalent to inertia. Secondly,
in case of heterogeneous populations, all individuals belonging to the same behavioural rule
receive the same payoff in a state in Ω¯ (as they make the same demand). Furthermore, because
FI(piI,t(xt)) ∈[min piI,t(xt), max piI,t(xt)], for all I ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the fitness of behavioural
rule RI equals the identical payoff received by each of its constituent individuals. Hence,
in any state in the set Ω¯, the payoff of an individual belonging to a particular behavioural
rule, and the fitness of that behavioural rule itself can be used as interchangeable terms.
In addition, if internal stability is satisfied, then all behavioural rules have equal fitness.
This implies that if a state in the set Ω¯ is internally stable, then the payoff received by all
individuals of the population is the same. I summarise this in the following observation.
Observation 1. (i) With positive probability, from any (other) state, the bargaining process
transitions into a state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand.
This implies that for a homogeneous population, with positive probability, the bargaining game
reaches a convention from any other state.
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(ii) In context of stability (neutral stability) of heterogeneous populations, stability (neutral
stability) of at least one state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state (neutrally stable
state), and instability (neutral instability) of all states where all individuals of a behavioural
rule make the same demand is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence of
a stable state (neutrally stable state). In such states, where all individuals of a behavioural
rule make the same demand, if the internal stability condition is satisfied, then all individuals
in the population receive the same payoff, and this payoff is also equal to the fitness of each
behavioural rule.
(iii) In context of stability of a homogeneous population, stability (neutral stability) of at
least one convention is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state
(neutrally stable state), and instability (neutral instability) of all conventions is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the non-existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state).
(iv) In any state where all individuals belonging to a particular behavioural rule make the
same demand, any inward-looking correspondence gives the same inward-looking set as would
be obtained by assuming inertia.
I will first analyse the implication of internal stability for a heterogeneous population, and
because of the above observation, I will focus on states in the set Ω¯. Since all individuals
of a behavioural rule make the same demand in a state in Ω¯, let XI denote the demand
made by individuals of the behavioural rule RI , where I ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Then the demand
vector (X1, . . . , XK) gives the demands made by individuals of each of the K behavioural
rule. Let x(1) < . . . < x(k¯) represent the distinct demands made in the state (belonging
to set Ω¯) whose stability is under consideration. So, x(1) and x(k¯) represent the minimum
and maximum demands made in that state respectively. Since the vector (x(1), . . . , x(k¯))
can be derived from the demand vector (X1, . . . , XK), I call the former the reduced demand
vector. Whenever it is more convenient, I also use xmin = x(1) and xmax = x(k¯). Since all
individuals belonging to a behavioural rule make the same demand, and because more than
one behavioural rule may make the same demand, it must be that 1 ≤ k¯ ≤ K.
The composite behavioural rule Rˆ(i) comprises of the set of behavioural rules such that
all individuals of the behavioural rules in Rˆ(i) demand x(i). The number of individuals
who demand x(i), i.e. the number of individuals of the composite behavioural rule Rˆ(i), is
denoted by n(i). Let n−1(i) be the number of individuals in the population who demand no
more than 1 − x(i); hence, n−1(i) is the number of successful bargains made by individuals
who make the ith lowest demand equal to x(i). By definition, n−1(1) ≥ . . . ≥ n−1(k¯).
Furthermore, the payoff of an individual demanding x(i) is n
−1(i)
n−1 x(i); this is the fitness not
only of his parent behavioural rule but also the fitness of each behavioural rule in Rˆ(i) as
well. Equality of payoff/fitness of a behavioural rule in Rˆ(i) and a behavioural rule in Rˆ(j)
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(recall internal stability) implies n
−1(i)
n−1 x(i) =
n−1(j)
n−1 x(j). Thus, if a behavioural rule that
demands a lower share of the pie is as fit as a behavioural rule that asks for a higher share,
then former must strike sufficiently greater number of bargains than the latter. Hence, in
an internally stable state, the inequality n−1(1) ≥ . . . ≥ n−1(k¯) above must hold strictly,
i.e. n−1(1) > . . . > n−1(k¯). I call the vectors (n(1), . . . , n(k¯)) and (n−1(1), . . . , n−1(k¯)) the
reduced composition vector and the reduced matching vector respectively.
In the lemmata to follow, I will assume that at least two distinct demands are made
in any state in the set Ω¯ (i.e. xmin 6= xmax) – this is because I will show in Proposition 3
(to follow later) that any state where individuals from all behavioural rules make the same
demand (i.e. xmin = xmax) is neutrally unstable for any heterogenous population. In addition
to xmin 6= xmax, I will also assume that there is at least one behavioural rule that obtains
positive fitness – an implication of this is that there is at least one behavioural rule whose
individuals choose a demand less than one-half (i.e. xmin ≤ 12); otherwise, i.e. if xmin 6= xmax
and xmin ≤ 12 , then I show in Observation 2 (to follow) that a mutant behavioural rule can
obtain higher fitness than an incumbent behavioural rule, leading to the state being neutrally
unstable for any heterogenous population. I will now show that internal stability substantially
narrows down the candidate states that may be stable. In particular:
• In Lemma 1, I demonstrate that in an internally stable state belonging to the set Ω¯,
the lowest demand must be strictly less than one-half, and this lowest demand is always
compatible with the demand made by any other individual.
• In Lemma 2, I show that the latter part of the previous sentence is true only for the
individuals who make the lowest demand, i.e. in an internally stable state in the set Ω¯,
any demand that is not the lowest demand is incompatible with the demand made some
individuals. In fact, the individuals who make the ith lowest demand find that their
demand is compatible only with the individuals who make the less than (i−1)th highest
demand; the corollary of this is that individuals who make the ith highest demand find
that their demand is compatible only with the individuals whose demand is at most
equal to the ith lowest demand. In Lemma 2, I also prove by construction that if an
internal stable state in the set Ω¯ exists, then there is at most one reduced composition
vector for a given reduced demand vector.
• In Lemma 3, I show that in an internally stable state belonging to the set Ω¯, the demand
of half of the pie acts as a divider in the sense that the ‘median’ demand (median defined
suitably for the case when k¯ is even) in the reduced demand vector is less than half but
the demand just above the median demand (in the reduced demand vector) is greater
than half.
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These lemmata culminate in Lemma 4, which establishes a hardwired behaviour-responsive
behaviour equivalence theorem which says that even though individuals respond to past in-
formation, a necessary condition for a state in the set Ω¯ to be internally stable is that each
individual should always make the same demand in response to any sample that he may draw
from the vector of demand, and this holds for all individuals. This implies that individuals
play as-if they were hardwired to make the same demand, and so, the stability analysis when
individuals are responsive to the demands made by individuals in the population is similar to
the stability analysis when they are hardwired to make a particular demand.
Lemma 1. Consider any state where all individuals of a particular behavioural rule make
the same demand. If 12 ≥ xmin 6= xmax and the internal stability condition holds, then
xmax ≤ 1− xmin and xmin < 12 < xmax.
Proof. First, suppose by contradiction that xmax > 1− xmin. Then, because xmax > xmin
(since xmin 6= xmax), xmax > 1 − xmin (by supposition) and xmax, xmin ∈ (0, 1), it must
be that xmin ≤ 12 and xmax > 12 . Then, the individuals who demand xmin obtain a positive
payoff (when they play against each other, or when they play against individuals who demand
no more than 1 − xmin).2 But because xmax > 1 − xmin, it must be that xmax > 1 − x(i)
∀i ∈ [1, . . . , k¯], i.e. individuals who play xmax never reach an agreement, and hence receive a
payoff of zero. It follows that the behavioural rules who demand xmax are less fit than the
behavioural rules who demand xmin. Since this contradicts internal stability, it must be that
xmax ≤ 1− xmin. But if xmax ≤ 1− xmin and xmax > xmin both hold, then xmin = 12 is not
possible; hence, xmin <
1
2 . This proves that xmin <
1
2 and xmax ≤ 1− xmin must hold.
Now, I will show that xmax >
1
2 must also hold. So, if (by contradiction) xmin < xmax ≤
1
2 , then all individuals in the population make compatible demands in all their bargaining
interactions. This implies n−1(1) = n−1(k¯) = n−1. Consequently, n−1(k¯)n−1 xmax > n
−1(1)
n−1 xmin,
i.e. the behavioural rules who demand xmax have a higher payoff/ fitness than individuals
who demand xmin, contradicting internal stability. Thus, xmin <
1
2 < xmax. 
Corollary 1. Consider any state where all individuals of a particular behavioural rule make
the same demand, 12 ≥ xmin 6= xmax, and internal stability holds. Then the fitness of each
behavioural rule equals xmin.
Lemma 2. Consider any state where all individuals of a particular behavioural rule make the
same demand. If 12 ≥ xmin 6= xmax and internal stability holds, then, for a population of fixed
size (of n individuals), and for a given vector of reduced demands (x(1), . . . , x(k¯)):
(i) 1− x(k¯ − i) ≥ x(i+ 1) > 1− x(k¯ − i+ 1),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k¯ − 1}
(ii) there exists at most one reduced composition vector (n(1), . . . , n(k¯)).
2Since I assume that there exists at least two individuals of a given behavioural rule, an individual who
demands xmin meets at least another individual who demands xmin.
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Proof. Because of internal stability, n
−1(i)
n−1 x(i) =
n−1(j)
n−1 x(j) for any two composite be-
havioural rules Rˆ(i), Rˆ(j). By Lemma 1, xmax ≤ 1−xmin; so, n−1(1) = n− 1, and the payoff
received by the behavioural rules demanding x(1) is x(1) itself. Then, n
−1(j)
n−1 x(j) = x(1)
holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}, and unique values of n−1(j) can be obtained.
Now, it must be that xmax > 1−x(2) ≥ x(k¯−1), or alternatively, 1−x(k¯) < x(2) ≤ 1−x(k¯−1).
Firstly, if xmax > 1−x(2) does not hold, then xmax ≤ 1−x(2) implies n−1(2) = n−1(1) = n−1,
and so, n
−1(j)
n−1 x(j) > x(1) for j = 2, thereby violating internal stability. But xmax > 1− x(2)
along with xmax ≤ 1 − xmin (from Lemma 1) implies n−1(k¯) = n(1); since I have already
shown that n−1(−j) is unique for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}, this gives the unique value of n(1).
Secondly, if x(k¯− 1) ≤ 1− x(2) does not hold, then x(k¯− 1) > 1− x(2), and so n−1(k¯− 1) =
n−1(k¯), thereby implying n
−1(k¯−1)
n−1 x(k¯ − 1) < n
−1(k¯)
n−1 x(k¯); but this violates internal stability.
This shows that 1 − x(k¯) < x(2) ≤ 1 − x(k¯ − 1). Furthermore, x(k¯ − 1) ≤ 1 − x(2) implies
n−1(k¯ − 1) ≥ n−1(k¯) + n(2).
For the same reason, 1 − x(k¯ − 1) < x(3) must hold; for if not, 1 − x(k¯ − 1) ≥ x(3) gives
n−1(2) = n−1(3), or, n
−1(2)
n−1 x(2) <
n−1(3)
n−1 x(3); but this violates internal stability. Again,
as before, 1 − x(k¯ − 1) < x(3) implies n−1(k¯ − 1) < n−1(k¯) + n(2) + n(3). Combining
n−1(k¯− 1) < n−1(k¯) + n(2) + n(3) and n−1(k¯− 1) ≥ n−1(k¯) + n(2) (from above), and taking
note of the fact that n−1(k¯ − 1) cannot take any value strictly in between n−1(k¯) + n(2) and
n−1(k¯) + n(2) + n(3), I get n−1(k¯ − 1) = n−1(k¯) + n(2); since I have shown that n−1(j) is
unique for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}, a unique value of n(2) is obtained.
Continuing in this manner, it must be that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k¯ − 1}, x(k¯ − i) ≤ 1 − x(i + 1) <
x(k¯ − i + 1), or alternatively 1 − x(k¯ − i) ≥ x(i + 1) > 1 − x(k¯ − i + 1), and so, the value
of n(i + 1) is obtained from n−1(k¯ − i) = n−1(k¯ − i + 1) + n(i + 1). Hence, the solution of
n−1(1), . . . , n−1(k¯) can be mapped back to obtain a unique solution for n(1), . . . , n(k¯). How-
ever, due to the population being finite, there may not exist a integer valued solution, thereby
completing the proof. 
Lemma 3. Consider any state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same
demand. Suppose 12 ≥ xmin 6= xmax and the internal stability condition holds. If k¯ is even,
then x( k¯2 ) <
1
2 and x(
k¯
2 + 1) >
1
2 , while if k¯ is odd, then x(
k¯+1
2 ) ≤ 12 and x( k¯+12 + 1) > 12 .
Proof. I will use the result 1 − x(k¯ − i) ≥ x(i + 1) > 1 − x(k¯ − i + 1), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}
from Lemma 2.
Suppose k¯ is even. Using i = k¯2 in x(i+ 1) > 1− x(k¯− i+ 1) gives x( k¯2 + 1) > 12 . Using i = k¯2
in 1− x(k¯ − i) ≥ x(i+ 1) gives x( k¯2 ) + x( k¯2 + 1) ≤ 1; combined with x( k¯2 + 1) > 12 , it implies
x( k¯2 ) <
1
2 . This proves the part of the lemma for k even.
Now, suppose k is odd. Using i = k¯−12 in 1 − x(k¯ − i) ≥ x(i + 1) gives x( k¯+12 ) ≤ 12 . Using
i = k¯−12 in x(i+1) > 1−x(k¯−i+1) gives x( k¯+12 )+x( k¯+12 +1) > 1; combined with x( k¯+12 ) ≤ 12 ,
it yields x( k¯+12 + 1) >
1
2 . This proves the part of the lemma for k odd. 
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Lemma 4. Consider any state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same
demand. Let XI be the demand made by individuals of behavioural rule RI . If
1
2 ≥ xmin 6=
xmax and the internal stability condition holds, then RI(s) = {XI} for any feasible sample s
from the demand vector describing the state, and this holds for all I ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
(Proof in the appendix)
Now, to put things together, Observation 1(i) informs that, with positive probability, the
bargaining game transitions to a state in Ω¯. According to Observation 1(ii), (iii), for stability,
it is sufficient to examine states in this set. By Observation 1(iv), in any state in Ω¯, the
only element of the inward-looking set is the demand made by that individual in that state.
Lemma 4 demonstrates that if a state in Ω¯ is internally stable, then the configuration of
demands must be such that the only element in the response set of any individual to any
random sample of demands must be the demand made by that individual in that state. This
implies that if a state in Ω¯ is internally stable, then it must be an absorbing state. Hence,
for the analysis of stability, it is sufficient to examine states in Ω¯ that are absorbing, and
in these states, even though the individuals are actually (mildly) responsive, it is as-if they
are hard-wired to play a particular strategy. I summarise this in the following hardwired
behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem.
Theorem 1. In the analysis of evolutionary stability of behavioural rules, even though in-
dividuals respond to demands made by other individuals, internal stability implies that it is
sufficient to examine the absorbing states of the bargaining process. Hence, even though the
individuals are responsive and may change the demand they make, a necessary condition for
a state to be stable is that the demands in the state should be such that it is as-if individuals
are hard-wired to play a particular strategy.
It is easy to construct examples of internally stable states with different behavioural rules
such that all individuals of each behavioural rule always make the same demand. For instance,
suppose that a heterogeneous population comprises of three mildly responsive behaviorial
rules, namely ‘extreme optimism’, ‘extreme pessimism’, and ‘mode-responsiveness’. These
behavioural rules are described below:
(a) when extremely optimistic individuals draw a sample of demands s, they assess that their
co-players will claim the lowest demand in the sample (i.e. min(s)) , and hence, they respond
by demanding 1−min(s),
(b) when extremely pessimistic individuals draw a sample of demands s, they assess that
their co-players will claim the highest demand in the sample (i.e. max(s)) , and hence, they
respond by demanding 1−max(s),
(c) when mode-responsive individuals draw a sample of demands s, they estimate that it is
optimal to demand 1− xmode, where xmode is a modal demand in the sample
17
Suppose that the population size n is such that 23 (n − 1) > n2 , and each individual samples
the entire history (i.e. S = n). Also suppose that the extremely pessimistic individuals
demand two-fifths of the pie and let the number of such individuals be 23 (n − 1). The rest
of the population comprises of the extremely optimistic individuals and the mode-responsive
individuals referred to above in some arbitrary proportion, and suppose that these individuals
demand three-fifths of the pie. Then, it can be easily verified that each of the three mildly
responsive behavioural rules continue to make the same demand in all ensuing states, and that
the payoff/fitness of each behavioural rule equals two-fifths – hence, this state is internally
stable.
As a consequence of the above theorem, I re-label and re-classify the different behavioural
rules that make an identical demand (in response to any sample of past period’s demand) as a
single composite behavioural rule. Specifically, the behavioural rules which always choose x(i)
are grouped together into a single composite behavioural rule, namely Rˆ(i). Thus, in context
of the example above, the re-labelling implies that there are only two distinct composite
behavioural rules – one comprising of the extremely pessimistic individuals, and a composite
behavioural rule comprising of the extremely optimistic individuals and the mode-responsive
individuals.
At this point, I re-iterate that the internal stability condition and its derived implications
are relevant only for a heterogeneous population. I now continue with the stability analysis
making use of the external stability condition. I will first present the results relating to
stability of a homogeneous population.
Proposition 1. A homogeneous population described by any mildly responsive behavioural
rule is unstable in the bargaining game.
Proof. By Observation 1, a convention is reached (with positive probability) from any
other state. So, suppose a mutant behavioural rule appears when the state is a convention
where all individuals have demanded x¯. First, suppose the incumbent behavioural rule is
such that supp(s) = {x¯} implies x¯ ∈ R(s). If the mutant behavioural rule is such that
supp(s) = {x¯} implies x¯ ∈ Rm(s), then all individuals (incumbent or mutant) demand x¯
with positive probability, and so, the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule equals that of
the incumbent behavioural rule. On the other hand, if the incumbent behavioural rule is
such that supp(s) = {x¯} implies 1− x¯ ∈ R(s), and the mutant behavioural rule is such that
supp(s) = {x¯} implies 1 − x¯ ∈ Rm(s), then all individuals (incumbent or mutant) demand
1− x¯ with positive probability, and so, the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule equals that
of the incumbent behavioural rule. Since this situation occurs with positive probability from
any state x, it follows that there does not exist any state and any mutant behavioural rule
such that whenever a mutant enters, pim(x) < F ((pii(x))i∈N\{m}) always holds. Hence, any
behavioural rule is unstable. 
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Proposition 2. (i) Any state apart from the equal split convention is a neutrally unstable
state for a homogeneous population comprised of any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
(ii) The equal split convention is a neutrally stable state for a homogeneous population com-
prised of any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
Proof. (i) By Observation 1, with positive probability, the bargaining process reaches a
convention where all individuals demand x¯. By the supposition in statement (i), x 6= 12 .
Firstly, suppose that x¯ < 12 , and a mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule enters the
population now. Consider a mutant behavioural rule Rm such that supp(s) = x¯ implies
1 − x¯ ∈ Rm(s). Then, with positive probability, all incumbent individuals demand x¯ < 12
(from the inward-looking set) while the mildly responsive mutant demands 1 − x¯ > 12 . This
results in the incumbents receiving x¯ < 12 of the pie in every interaction (and hence, also on
average), while the mutant receives 1− x¯ > 12 of the pie in every interaction (and thus, also
on average). As a result, the mutant’s fitness (which equals 1− x¯ > 12) is strictly greater than
that of any incumbent (the fitness of the incumbents being x¯ < 12). Consequently, all such
states are neutrally unstable states for any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
Secondly, suppose that x¯ > 12 , and a mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule enters the
population now. Consider a mutant behavioural rule Rm such that supp(s) = x¯ implies
1 − x¯ ∈ Rm(s). Then, with positive probability, all incumbent individuals demand x¯ > 12
(from the inward-looking set) while the mildly responsive mutant demands 1 − x¯ < 12 . This
results in each of the incumbent individuals receiving x¯ > 12 of the pie in their only interaction
with the mutant while the mutant receives 1− x¯ < 12 of the pie in every interaction. So, the
payoff (i.e. average share received across all n − 1 interactions) of an incumbent individual
is 1n−1 x¯, while the payoff of the mutant is 1 − x¯. The fitness of the mutant behavioural
rule is strictly greater than that of any incumbent behavioural rule when 1 − x¯ > 1n−1 x¯, or
n > 1+ x¯1−x¯ . Consequently, such states are neutrally unstable states for any mildly responsive
behavioural rule.
(ii) I only have to show that the equal split convention is a neutrally stable state for any
mildly responsive behavioural rule and any mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule. Once
an equal-split convention is reached, it is absorbing, and so the incumbents never make any
other demand. So, if a mildly responsive mutant appears in an equal-split convention, it also
demands one-half. The incumbents and the mutant receive half of the pie on average. Hence,
the fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule and the mutant behavioural rule is identical
for any mildly responsive incumbent behavioural rule and for any mildly responsive mutant
behavioural rule. Then, statement (ii) of the proposition follows. 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 indicate that, in terms of stability, all mildly responsive
behavioural rules are similar – sophisticated mildly responsive behavioural rules are as sta-
ble/unstable as relatively naive mildly responsive behavioural rules. Not only can a homo-
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geneous population described any mildly responsive behavioural rule be invaded by a mildly
responsive mutant rule but a mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule can further displace
any mildly responsive incumbent behavioural rule unless the incumbent behavioural rule set-
tles on the equal split convention. In the latter case (that the equal split convention is
attained), any incumbent and mutant behavioural rules can co-exist without displacing one
another. I summarise these results in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. In context of a homogeneous population, all mildly responsive behavioural rules
are unstable in the bargaining game. Furthermore, any state apart from the equal-split con-
vention is neutrally unstable for any mildly responsive behavioural rule. However, the equal
split convention is the unique neutrally stable state for any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
The stability result presented above is based on the premise that a population comprises
of a single behavioural rule – I consider this to be the analogue of the conventional notion of
evolutionary stability of a monomorphic population. In what follows, I analyse the stability
of a heterogeneous population, i.e. a population comprised of multiple behavioural rules –
this may be considered to be the analogue of the conventional notion of evolutionary stability
of a polymorphic population. In this analysis, I will only consider states that are internally
stable, i.e. I will only consider states in Ω¯ that are absorbing.
First, consider a heterogeneous population with one composite behavioural rule. The
arguments used for the case of a homogeneous population (recall Proposition 2) can be used
to now argue that the equal-split state is the only neutrally stable. I summarise this in the
next proposition (without proof, since the arguments have already been made in the proof of
Proposition 2).
Proposition 3. The equal split state, where all individuals demand half of the pie, is the only
neutrally stable state for any heterogeneous population. Any other state where all individuals
in a heterogeneous population make an identical demand is neutrally unstable.
Now, suppose that there the heterogeneous population is comprised of at least two com-
posite behavioural rules; so xmin 6= xmax. I now argue that in this case, a necessary condition
for a state to not be neutrally unstable is x(1) ≤ 12 and x(1) = 1−xmax (by Lemma 1, internal
stability requires x(1) ≤ 1− xmax):
(i) Firstly, suppose that there are at least two composite behavioural rules, and that x(1) > 12 .
Then, none of the individuals obtain a positive share of the pie in any of their bargaining
interactions, and the fitness of all behavioural rules equals zero. Now suppose that a mildly
responsive mutant behavioural rule appears, the source behavioural rule being one where in-
dividuals demand a share greater x(1), and the mutant demands 1−x(1). Then, the mutant’s
fitness is strictly positive as it obtains 1−x(1) share of the pie in all its bargaining interactions
with individuals of the composite behavioural rule that demand x(1); however, the fitness of
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all behavioural rules that demand a share greater than x(1) is still zero. Since the fitness of
the mutant behavioural rule is strictly higher than that of some of the incumbent behavioural
rules, states where there exist at least two composite behavioural rules and x(1) > 12 are
neutrally unstable.
(ii) Secondly, if x(1) ≤ 12 but x(1) < 1− x(k¯), then a mildly responsive mutant may demand
xm = 1 − x(1). Then, the number of successful bargains by the mutant is n(1), which is
also the number of successful bargains struck by individuals of the behavioural rules who
demand x(k¯); however, since the mutant obtains a higher share of the pie whenever he strikes
a successful bargain, he obtains strictly higher fitness than the behavioural rules who demand
x(k¯). This results in the neutral instability of states comprised of at least two composite
behavioural rules such that x(1) < 1− x(k¯). Thus, a necessary condition for neutral stability
of a state is xmin ≤ 12 and x(1) = 1− xmax. I summarise this in the following observation.
Observation 2. In context of a heterogeneous population with at least two composite be-
havioural rules, a necessary condition for a state to not be neutrally unstable is x(1) ≤ 12 and
x(1) = 1− x(k¯).
Now, I first show in Proposition 4 that any state where there are exactly two composite
behavioural rules in the heterogeneous population is unstable. In Proposition 5, I present the
same result for a heterogeneous population with at least three composite behavioural rules.
Proposition 4. All states are neutrally unstable for any heterogeneous population comprised
of exactly two composite behavioural rules.
Proof. Let the demand made by individuals of the two composite behavioural rules,
Rˆ(1) and Rˆ(2), be xmin = x(1) and xmax = x(2) respectively. The population size is n.
Because of Observation 2, a necessary condition for a state to not be neutrally unstable is
1
2 ≥ xmin = 1 − xmax; so, I only consider such states. Internal stability implies that the
payoff of each individual in the population must be x(1) (recall Corollary 1). Each individual
belonging to Rˆ(1) obtains a payoff of x(1); in order for the same to hold for individuals of Rˆ(2),
it must be that the number of individuals belonging to the behavioural rule who demand x(1)
is 1−x(2)x(2) (n− 1) – in this case (and only in this case), the payoff of an individual of composite
behavioural rule Rˆ(2) equals
1−x(2)
x(2)
(n−1)
n−1 x(2) = 1− x(2) = x(1). (The individuals belonging
to the composite behavioural rule Rˆ(2) obtain a positive fraction of the pie when only they
meet individuals belonging to Rˆ(1)). Let me denote the fraction of individuals belonging to
Rˆ(1) by q; so q =
1−x(2)
x(2)
(n−1)
n .
Suppose now that a mutant originates from the behavioural rule Rˆ(1), and demands xm =
x(2). Then, the fitness of any individual in Rˆ(1) remains 1 − x(2), while the fitness of any
individual in Rˆ(2) now is (qn)−1n−1 x(2) < 1 − x(2). The mutant’s fitness is (qn)−1n−1 x(2). Since
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the mutant behavioural rule’s fitness is at least as much as that of an incumbent behavioural
rule, and because the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules is not the same, all such states
are neutrally unstable. 
Proposition 5. All states are neutrally unstable for any heterogeneous population comprised
of at least three composite behavioural rules.
Proof. If the state is not internally stable, then this is trivially true. So, in what follows, I
will assume the state to be internally stable and I will use the external stability criterion to
show that any internally stable state must be neutrally unstable.
Firstly, if k¯ ≥ 3 and k¯ is even, then, by Lemma 3, x( k¯2 ) < 12 , and x( k¯2 + 1) > 12 . The
payoff received by each behavioural rule equals x(1) (by Corollary 1). Now, suppose an
individual from the composite behavioural rule demanding x(1) mutates and demands xm =
x( k¯2 ) instead. Then, the mutant’s payoff is same as the payoff of the individuals demanding
x( k¯2 ); since the number of successful bargains made by the individuals of the composite
behavioural rule demanding x( k¯2 ) remains the same, this payoff remains x(1). However,
the payoff of the behavioural rules demanding x(k¯) decreases. Prior to the appearance of
the mutant, their payoff was n
−1(k¯)
n−1 x(k¯) = x(1); now, due to the mutation, the number of
successful bargains they make reduces by one, and so their payoff is less than x(1). Hence,
the fitness of this composite behavioural rule is strictly less than that of the mutant’s, and
the incumbent population is not neutrally stable.
Secondly, if k¯ ≥ 3 and k¯ is odd, then, by Lemma 3, x( k¯+12 ) ≤ 12 , and x( k¯+12 + 1) > 12 . More
specifically, x(1), x(2) ≤ 12 , and x(k¯) = 1 − x(1). The fitness/payoff of each behavioural
rule equals x(1) (by Corollary 1). Then, by internal stability, it must be that the fitness
of the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2) is n
−1(2)
n−1 x(2) = x(1). Now suppose
an individual from the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2) mutates and demands
x(k¯). Then, because n−1(k¯) = n(1) does not change, the mutant’s fitness (and the fitness of
all individual demanding x(k¯)) is n
−1(k¯)
n−1 x(k¯) = x(1). However, now, due to the mutation, the
number of successful bargains made by the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2)
reduces by one, and so their payoff is less than x(1). Thus, the source behavioural rule is
less fit than the mutant behavioural rule. [More generally, suppose an individual from the
composite behavioural rule that demands x(i), where i ∈ int(1, k¯2 ] if k¯ is even or i ∈ int(1, k¯+12 )
if k is odd, mutates and now demands xm ∈ {x(k¯ − i + 1), . . . , x(k¯)}. Then, the mutant’s
fitness is x(i) but the source behavioural rule’s fitness is strictly less than that.] Thus, any
state is neutrally unstable. 
The propositions presented above show that all states, apart from the equal split state where
all individuals demand exactly one-half of the pie in their bargaining interactions, are neutrally
unstable. Only in the equal split state is it possible to definitely say that each behavioural
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rule can stably co-exist, not only with each other, but with any mildly responsive mutant
behavioural rule as well. I conclude this section by summarising these results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. In the bargaining game, any state apart from the equal-split state is neutrally
unstable for any finite heterogeneous population. The equal-split state is the only state that is
neutrally stable for any finite heterogeneous population, and hence, it is the only state where
disparate behavioural rules can stably co-exist.
3 The bargaining game with a continuum of individuals
The previous section establishes the instability of homogeneous and heterogeneous popula-
tions under the assumption that the population is finite. In this section, I will modify the
finite population framework, and instead, consider a population of individuals distributed
uniformly over a continuum of constant mass; without loss of generality, let individuals be
uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. The pertinence of this exercise comes from
the observation in Schaffer (1988) that a strategy profile that is evolutionarily stable when the
population is finite may not carry over to the case where individuals are distributed uniformly
over a unit interval. Hence, the question here is: do the results for the finite population case
carry over to this case? The answer to this question is in the affirmative, and in order to
show this, I will cast the model in terms of the notation of the finite population case; then, it
can be easily verified that the arguments made in the previous section hold, thereby proving
the robustness of the results.
The state at a particular time is given by the demands made by the individuals. Each
individual decides on the demand that he will make in each period in the same manner as
described in the previous section:
(a) (suppressing the time-index) with probability p(i) ∈ (0, 1), each individual i ∈ [0, 1]
samples fraction S (S ∈ (0, 1] being fixed exogenously) of the demands. Let si(x) be the cu-
mulative distribution of demands derived from his randomly drawn sample. His behavioural
rule Ri gives rise to a response set Ri(si(x)) and each element of Ri(si(x)) is chosen by in-
dividual i with positive probability. Suppose that the population comprises of K disparate
behavioural rules. I assume that each of the extant behavioural rules is followed by a positive
mass of individuals. Let the Ith behavioural rule be denoted by RI , where I ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Thus, individual i follows behavioural rule RI if Ri(s(x)) = RI(s(x)), for all cumulative dis-
tributions of demands s(x) that may be generated from any sample of demands.
(b) (suppressing the time-index) with the complimentary probability 1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), indi-
vidual i chooses a demand from his inward-looking set. As before, each individual is aware of
the demands made in the previous period by individuals of the same behavioural rule, and the
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inward-looking set is a subset of the set of these demands. Each element of the inward-looking
set may be chosen by individual i.
The state of the bargaining game at a particular time t is given by the cumulative dis-
tribution function of demands Xt(·) defined over the interval [0, 1]. So, Xt(a) is the fraction
of individuals who make a demand less than or equal to a, where a ∈ (0, 1). Now, consider
any state. With positive probability, all individuals of a particular behavioural rule draw the
same sample, and respond by choosing the same demand. Thus, starting from any state,
with positive probability, the bargaining game transitions to the state where all individuals
of a behavioural rule choose the same demand, and this holds for all behavioural rules. Let
the set of such states be denote by Ω¯, and let XI denote the demand made by all individuals
who follow behavioural rule RI . Thus, (X1, . . . , XK) is the demand vector corresponding to
a state in Ω¯. Let x(1) < x(2) < . . . < x(k¯) be the distinct demands made in this state. The
vector (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k¯)) is the reduced demand vector, and the composite behavioural
rule Rˆ(i) is the set of behavioural rules such that all individuals who follow a behavioural
rule in this set demand x(i). The share of individuals demanding x(i), or alternatively, the
fraction of individuals following a behavioural rule in the set Rˆ(i) is denoted by n(i), and
n−1(i) denotes the share of individual who demand no more than 1 − x(i). For any state in
the set Ω¯, the average share of the pie received by any individual following a behavioural rule
in the set Rˆ(i) is Σk¯j=1 n(j)pi(x(i), x(j)), where pi(x(i), x(j)) equals x(i) if x(i) + x(j) ≤ 1,
and equals zero otherwise. Since the average share of the pie received by all individuals of a
behavioural rule is the same, the fitness of all behavioural rules in the composite set Rˆ(i) is
also equal to Σk¯j=1 n(j)pi(x(i), x(j)).
A particular state of this population of K disparate behavioural rules is stable (neutrally
stable) if it satisfies:
(i) internal stability: a state x is internally stable if FI(piI(y)) = FJ(piJ(y)) for all behavioural
rules I, J = 1, . . . ,K and for all y ∈ x ∪ Suc∞(x), i.e. all behavioural rules are equally fit if
not only in that particular state but in all states that the bargaining game may transition to
with positive probability, and,
(ii) external stability: a state x is externally stable (neutrally externally stable) if there
exists ε¯ > 0, such that if ε fraction of individuals from a particular behavioural rule mutate
and follow some other mildly responsive behavioural rule Rm, then FI(piI(y)) > Fm(pim(y))
(FI(piI(y)) ≥ Fm(pim(y)) and if FI(piI(y)) = Fm(pim(y)), then FI(piI(y)) = FJ(pim(y))) for
all behavioural rules I, J = 1, . . . ,K, for all y ∈ x ∪ Suc∞(x) and for all ε ≤ ε¯. A state
is stable (neutrally stable) if it satisfies internal stability and external stability (neutrally
external stability); otherwise, it is said to be unstable (neutrally unstable).
The notation in this section corresponds exactly with the corresponding notation in the
previous section. It is then easily verified that all the results obtained earlier hold in toto.
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Hence, I again obtain the hardwired behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem as
well as the stability results for a homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. I summarise
this in the next theorem.
Theorem 4. The stability results in the bargaining game are identical, irrespective of the
individuals in the population are finite or distributed over a continuum of fixed mass. This
implies that:
(i) when the population is heterogeneous, any state apart from the equal-split state is neutrally
unstable; the equal-split state is the only state that is neutrally stable and thus the only state
where disparate behavioural rules can stably co-exist.
(ii) when the population is homogeneous, all mildly responsive behavioural rules are unstable;
furthermore, any state apart from the equal-split convention is neutrally unstable for any
mildly responsive behavioural rule, and the equal split convention is a neutrally stable state
for any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop the notion of evolutionary stability of behavioural rules, and apply it in
the context of a bargaining game. The motivation for this comes from the supposition that in
socio-economic contexts, it seems reasonable that individuals react and respond to the manner
in which the strategic situation has played out in the past, and that the manner in which
individuals respond is determined by a behavioural rule. I impose a weak restriction on the
permissible behavioural rules, namely ‘mild responsiveness’, which serves to rule out situations
where the behavioural rule is completely unresponsive to the history of the game. In general,
the population may comprise of individuals who follow various disparate behavioural rules,
and the fitness of each behavioural rule is a function of the average share of the pie/surplus
received by the individuals following that behavioural rule. In order for a population to be
stable, I impose two conditions: (i) internal stability, which requires all incumbent behavioural
rules to be equally fit so as to preserve the composition of the incumbent population, and
(ii) external stability, which requires each incumbent behavioural rules to be, at the very
least, at least as fit as any mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule that may appear in the
population.
The main message of the paper is that irrespective of the population being finite or infinite,
(i) internal stability implies that a necessary condition for stability is that there exists a state
where the configuration of demands made by individuals in the population must be such
that an individual responds to the recent history of play by choosing the same demand, and
this holds for all individuals, and (ii) external stability, in general, shows the instability of
behavioural rules, with the state where all individuals choose to split the surplus/pie equally
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being the only neutrally stable state. Thus, this is the only state where different behavioural
rules can co-exist without displacing one another – in this sense, the equal splitting norm
may be interpreted as the only state where it is possible to sustain co-existence of diverse
behavioural rules.
Appendix
Lemma 4. Consider any state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same de-
mand. Let XI be the demand made by individuals of behavioural rule RI . If
1
2 ≥ xmin 6= xmax
and the internal stability condition holds, then RI(s) = {XI} for any feasible sample s from
the demand vector describing the state, and this holds for all I ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. suppose that for a particular behavioural rule RI , there ex-
ists at least one sample s of size S from the demand vector such that X ′I ∈ RI(s), and
X ′I 6= XI . I distinguish between three mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: (i)
X ′I ∈ {x(1), . . . , x(k¯)}, (ii) X ′I 6∈ {x(1), . . . , x(k¯)} and either X ′I < x(1) or X ′I > x(k¯), and
(iii) X ′I ∈ (x(1), x(k¯)) but X ′I 6∈ {x(1), . . . , x(k¯)}. I will prove the lemma by showing that
internal stability is violated in each case.
In case of (i), I consider the positive probability event that some individuals of behavioural
rule RI choose the alternative response X
′
I while other individuals of the same behavioural
rule, due to the inward-looking set, choose XI ; because of the inward-looking set, individ-
uals of all other behavioural rules choose the demand they made in the last period. (Since
each behavioural rule has at least two individuals, this always happens with positive prob-
ability.) In case of (ii) and (iii), I consider the event – which occurs with positive prob-
ability – that all individuals of behavioural rule RI choose the alternative response X
′
I ,
while, because of the inward looking set, individuals of all other behavioural rules choose
the demand they made in the last period. As a result of this, let three vectors of the previ-
ous state (X1, . . . , XK), (x(1), . . . , x(k¯)) and (n(1), . . . , n(k¯)) be transformed to the vectors
(Xˆ1, . . . , XˆK), (xˆ(1), . . . , xˆ(k¯′)) and (nˆ(1), . . . , nˆ(k¯′)) respectively in the new state.
Case (i): Here, the reduced demand vectors are identical but the reduced composition vectors
are distinct i.e. (x(1), . . . , x(k¯)) = (xˆ(1), . . . , xˆ(k¯′)) but (n(1), . . . , n(k¯)) 6= (nˆ(1), . . . , nˆ(k¯′)).
By Lemma 2, if the reduced demand vector is (x(1), . . . , x(k¯)), then there is a unique reduced
composition where all behavioural rules are equally fit; hence, if all the behavioural rules
were equally fit when the reduced composition vector was (n(1), . . . , n(k¯)), they cannot be
equally fit when the reduced composition vector changes to (nˆ(1), . . . , nˆ(k¯′)). Thus, I get a
contradiction to internal stability.
Case (ii): First, I will prove by contradiction that X ′I > x(1). So, suppose on the contrary,
X ′I = xˆ(1) < x(1) (note that X
′
I 6= x(1) by case (i) above). Then either xˆ(2) = x(2) or
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xˆ(2) = x(1). xˆ(2) = x(2) implies that second lowest demand in the current period was also
the second lowest demand in the previous period. This happens only when XI = x(1) and
XH 6= x(1) ∀H ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and H 6= I, i.e. in the previous period, the specific demand x(1)
was made only by the individuals belonging to the behavioural rule RI but not by individu-
als of any other behavioural rule. Since all individuals of behavioural rule RI now demand
X ′I 6= x(1) in the current period, x(1) is not demanded by anyone in the current period, and
so, the second lowest demand in the last period (i.e. x(2)) becomes the second lowest demand
in this period (i.e. xˆ(2)). On the other hand, xˆ(2) = x(1) implies that the second lowest
demand in the current period was the lowest demand in the previous period; this happens
when there is another behavioural rule that had demanded x(1) in previous period, and by
making a choice from the inward-looking set, they also demand it in the current period.
By Lemma 1, in the previous period, n−1(1) = n− 1 and by Corollary 1, internal stability of
the previous state gives that the fitness of each behavioural rule must have been x(1). In the
current state, since X ′I < x(1), nˆ
−1(1) = n− 1 as well; as a result, the fitness of behavioural
rule RI is X
′
I < x(1). Now, first consider xˆ(2) = x(2), which occurs only when XI = x(1)
and XH 6= x(1) ∀H ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and H 6= I (see explanation given in the earlier paragraph).
Because individuals from all other behavioural rules apart from rule RI make the same de-
mand as in the last period (by choosing from the inward-looking set) and individuals from
behavioural rule RI make a lower demand in this period, the number of successful matches of
individuals of the behavioural rules demanding x(2) does not change between the two states;
this implies that the fitness of this behavioural rule remains x(1). On the other hand, if
xˆ(2) = x(1), then there exist behavioural rules that demand x(1) in the current state. Since
all individuals in each of these behavioural rules continue to make n − 1 successful bargains
in the current state, the fitness of these behavioural rules remains x(1). In either case, since
the fitness of behavioural rule RI in this period is X
′
I < x(1), where x(1) is the fitness in the
current state of at least one other behavioural rule, internal stability does not hold in this
current state. Hence, X ′i > x(1).
Now, I will prove by contradiction that X ′I < x(k¯). So suppose, to the contrary, X
′
I > x(k¯)
(note that X ′I 6= x(k¯) by case (i) above). There are two possibilities: either (a) x(2) = xˆ(1),
or (b) x(1) = xˆ(1).
(a) x(2) = xˆ(1) implies that in this state, the demand x(1) is not made by any behavioural
rule. This happens if and only if no individual apart from the individuals belonging to the
behavioural rule RI demanded x(1) in the previous state; since all these individuals choose
X ′I = xˆ(k¯
′), the second lowest demand in the previous state becomes the lowest demand in
this state. Now, if only two distinct demands were made in the previous state (i.e. k¯ = 2), then
by Lemma 3, x(2) > 12 ; since x(2) = xˆ(1), x(2) >
1
2 is equivalent to xˆ(1) >
1
2 ; but xˆ(1) >
1
2
contradicts internal stability of the current state (see Lemma 1). On the other hand, if at least
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three distinct demands were made in the previous state, then x(2) = xˆ(1) ≤ 12 (see Lemma 3);
but because xˆ(1) = x(2) > 1 − x(k¯) (where the last inequality comes from Lemma 2), and
because X ′I = xˆ(k¯
′) > x(k¯), individuals belonging to the behavioural rule RI make zero suc-
cessful bargains in the current state, and hence obtain zero fitness; however, the fitness of the
behavioural rule(s) demanding x(2) = xˆ(1) is strictly positive, thereby contradicting internal
stability in the current state. Hence, X ′I < x(k¯).
(b) Because of (a) above, I focus on the case where x(1) = xˆ(1). Now there are two pos-
sibilities: either 1 − x(1) ≥ X ′I > x(k¯), or X ′I > 1 − x(1) ≥ x(k¯), where the inequality
1 − x(1) ≥ x(k¯) comes from the internal stability of the previous state and Lemma 1. If
1− x(1) ≥ X ′I > x(k¯) holds, then individuals of behavioural rule RI make the same number
of bargains as the individuals of the behavioural rules choosing x(k¯).3 Since X ′I > x(k¯), the
fitness of behavioural rule RI is higher than the fitness of the behavioural rules that demand
x(k¯) – a violation of internal stability. If, on the other hand, 1−x(1) < X ′I , then the individ-
uals of behavioural rule RI never make a compatible demand and hence, obtain zero fitness;
however, the fitness of the behavioural rule demanding x(1) = xˆ(1) is positive – this again
contradicts internal stability. Thus, in either case, X ′I < x(k¯).
Case (iii): It follows from Case (i) and (ii) above that X ′I ∈ (x(1), x(k¯)). I will now first
establish (in Step 1) that in the new state, after the all individuals of behavioural rule RI
demand X ′I , the lowest demand does not change, i.e. x(1) = xˆ(1); because of Corollary 1, this
implies that the fitness of any behavioural rule in an internally stable state must equal x(1).
Step 2 concludes the proof.
Step 1. Suppose (by contradiction) that x(1) 6= xˆ(1). Then: either (a) x(2) = xˆ(1), or (b)
X ′I = xˆ(1), which implies X
′
I ∈ (x(1), x(2)) (note X ′I ≤ x(1) cannot hold because of Case (i)
and Case (ii) above).
(a) First consider x(2) = xˆ(1). Because of Lemma 2, in the previous period, x(2) > 1− x(k¯).
But now, in the new state, because X ′I < x(k¯) (by Case (i) and Case (ii) above), x(k¯) = xˆ(k¯′)
must hold; again, by Lemma 1, if the new state is internally stable, then xˆ(1) ≤ 1 − xˆ(k¯′),
i.e. using xˆ(1) = x(2) and xˆ(k¯′) = x(k¯), x(2) ≤ 1 − x(k¯) must hold. But this contradicts
x(2) > 1− x(k¯); so x(2) 6= xˆ(1).
(b) If X ′I = xˆ(1), then by Lemma 1, if the new state is internally stable, it must be that
xˆ(1) ≤ 1 − xˆ(k¯′); since xˆ(k¯′) = x(k¯), xˆ(1) ≤ 1 − xˆ(k¯′) implies xˆ(1) ≤ 1 − x(k¯). But if
xˆ(1) ≤ 1− x(k¯), then all individuals who demand xˆ(1) find that their demand is compatible
with all other individuals; consequently, their fitness equals xˆ(1), However, note that nothing
changes for individuals belonging to other behavioural rules; they make the same demand,
3By Lemma 2 and internal stability of the previous state, the number of successful bargains made by
individuals demanding x(k¯) is n(1); since 1−x(1) ≥ X ′I > x(k¯), the individuals demanding X ′I also make n(1)
successful bargains.
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and also conclude the same number of successful bargains; consequently their payoff in the
new state is the same as their payoff in the old state. By Corollary 1, their payoff in the
old state was x(1) < X ′I ; thus, their payoff in the new state is lower than the payoff of the
individuals belonging to behavioural rule RI – a contradiction to internal stability.
This proves that x(1) remains the lowest demand in the new state; by Corollary 1, the fitness
of each behavioural rule in an internally stable state must be x(1).
Step 2. (a) From (the proof of) Lemma 2, n−1(j) is unique for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}; further
1−x(k¯−j) ≥ x(j+1) > 1−x(k¯−j+1) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k¯−1}, and x(1) ≤ 1−x(k¯). Suppose
that XI , which is the demand made by all individuals of behavioural rule RI in the previous
period, is also equal to x(h+ 1) for some h+ 1 ∈ {1, . . . , k¯− 1}; using the inequalities above,
it lies in the interval (1− x(k¯ − h+ 1), 1− x(k¯ − h)] if h+ 1 ∈ {2, . . . , k¯ − 1} or (0, 1− x(k¯)]
if h+ 1 = 1.
Importantly, in either case, by Step 1 above, the lowest demand does not change across the
previous state and the current state. As a result, by Corollary 1, for internal stability in both
the previous and current states, the fitness of each behavioural rule must equal x(1). Since all
other behavioural rules apart from RI make the same demand, if all behavioural rules have
to have the same level of fitness equal to x(1) in both periods, n−1(j) cannot change for all
j 6= h+ 1, i.e. n−1(j) = nˆ−1(j) for all j 6= h+ 1. Further, since all demands x(j), j 6= h+ 1,
are made in both the previous and current states, it must be that the number of individuals
making a demand in the interval (1− x(k¯ − h+ 1), 1− x(k¯ − h)] if h+ 1 ∈ {2, . . . , k¯ − 1} or
in the interval (0, 1− x(k¯)] if h+ 1 = 1 does not change. This implies that X ′I must lie in the
same interval as XI = x(h+ 1), i.e. if XI lies in the interval (1− x(k¯ − h+ 1), 1− x(k¯ − h)],
then X ′I must lie in the same interval as well; otherwise, if XI lies in the interval (0, 1−x(k¯)],
then X ′I lies in this interval as well. If, on the contrary, X
′
I were to lie in a different interval,
then it would cause a change in n−1(j) for some j 6= h+ 1, thereby resulting in a behavioural
rule obtaining a level of fitness different from x(1); this contradicts the observation that for
internal stability to be maintained, the payoff of all behavioural rules must equal x(1) in both
the previous and the current states. Hence, X ′I lies in the same interval as XI .
(b) As a result of (a) above, suppose now that X ′I lies in the same interval as XI . Then,
the lowest demand that is incompatible with X ′I is also the lowest demand in the last period
that was incompatible with XI ; similarly, the highest demand that is compatible with X
′
I
is also the highest demand in the last period that was compatible with XI . Hence, each
individual of the behavioural rule RI makes the same number of successful bargains in both
the previous state and the current state (note that this rests on the argument that because
of inertia, individuals from all other behavioural rules make the same demand in both the
previous period and current period). However, since XI 6= X ′I , the fitness of behavioural
rule RI differs between the two states; but I have argued (above) that for internal stability
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to be satisfied, the fitness of each behavioural rule must equal x(1). This contradicts internal
stability; hence, X ′I cannot lie in the same interval as XI .
It follows from the consideration of cases (i)-(iii) that if individuals of a behavioural rule RI
have another response X ′I 6= XI to any sample of demands in the last period, then with
positive probability, there is a transition to a state where all behavioural rules do not have
the same payoff, and so, the internal stability condition is violated, thus proving the lemma.

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